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Securities Regulation
by David K. Brown*
and Valerie D. Barton*"
This Article examines significant securities regulation cases originating in the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals during 2003 and 2004. In
particular, Part I of this Article addresses a recent decision in the area
of insider trading and familial relationships. Part II analyzes two recent
cases involving the definition of "security" under the Securities Act of
1933.1 The three cases discussed below address two very different
issues and draw from two separate areas of securities law, the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2 However, a
common theme connects these cases: the preservation of flexibility
within the securities laws. As demonstrated in the following holdings,
courts have long recognized the overarching principle in federal
securities laws to provide a flexible body of law that may be interpreted
and applied to situations not originally contemplated by the laws'
drafters and to situations conceived for the purpose of circumventing
such laws. Although the courts temper such principles through
application of certain general tests and the requirement of certain
elements, the courts have, with little exception, refused to adopt brightline or rigid tests when it comes to interpreting the securities laws.

* Associate in the firm of McKenna Long & Aldridge LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. Emory
University (B.A., 1995); Georgia State University, J. Mack Robinson College of Business
(M.B.A., 2000); Georgia State University College of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2000). Member
and Associate Editor, Georgia State University Law Review (1999-2000). Member, State
Bars of Georgia and Florida.
** Associate in the firm of McKenna Long & Aldridge LLP, Atlanta, Georgia.
University of South Carolina (B.A., magna cum laude, 1986); University of South Carolina
Master of International Business (M.I.B., 1988); Emory University College of Law (J.D.,

2002). Member and Associate Editor, Emory Law Journal (2000-2002). Member, State Bar
of Georgia.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2004).
2. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2004).
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I. THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT CLARIFIES THE ELEMENTS OF INSIDER
TRADING CLAIMS BROUGHT UNDER THE MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY OF
LIABILITY
Although sharing confidences may strengthen the bonds of familial
relationships, in the contentious realm of "insider trading," exchanging
business-related confidences with family members could have the
deleterious side-effect of triggering the attention, and then the wrath, of
the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). In SEC v. Yun,3 the
Eleventh Circuit clarified its position with respect to two of the elements
of proof under the misappropriation theory of liability for securities
fraud: (1) the establishment of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality owed
to the source of confidential information in the context of non-business
relationships, such as husband/wife or parent/child, and (2) the requisite
showing that the tipper intended to benefit from her disclosure of
confidential information.4 With respect to both matters, the Eleventh
Circuit stopped short of adopting the SEC's position, apparently rejecting
the SEC's attempts to lessen its burden of proof in insider trading cases
brought 5 under the increasingly popular misappropriation theory of
liability.

First, the court rejected the bright-line rule set forth in Rule 10b5-2
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"),6 which
mandates that a duty of trust and confidence is presumed to exist when
a person receives or obtains material, nonpublic information from
spouses, parents, children, and siblings.' The court instead concluded
the existence of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality (a phrase used
interchangeably with the duty of trust and confidence) turns on whether
3. 327 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2003).
4. Id. at 1272-74.
5. Id. at 1273, 1274-80. The Eleventh Circuit has similarly rebuffed attempts by the
SEC to reduce its burden of proof in insider trading cases. For example, in United States
v. Adler, 137 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1998), the Eleventh Circuit refused to eliminate the
SEC's burden of proof to show that the alleged "insider" actually used material, nonpublic
information in making the decision to trade, which is a required element of a Rule 10b-5
insider trading violation. Id. at 1337 ("We believe that the use test best comports with
precedent and Congressional intent, and that mere knowing possession-i.e., proof that an
insider traded while in possession of material nonpublic information-is not a per se
violation"). Instead, the court held that a strong inference arises when an insider trades
securities in possession of material, nonpublic information that such information was used
by the insider in making the decision to trade. Id. The burden of proof then shifts to the
defendant to prove that the material, nonpublic information was not a part of the trading
decision. Id.
6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2004).
7. Id.
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the confiding spouse granted access to confidential information to her
spouse based upon (1) an express promise or (2) a reasonable reliance
that she would safeguard the information when reliance would be proven
by evidence of a history or pattern of sharing and keeping business
confidences.8 Second, the court soundly rejected the SEC's attempt to
lessen its burden of proof in insider trading cases by steadfastly
requiring proof of tippers' intent to benefit from their disclosure of
confidential information under the misappropriation theory of liability.9
The MisappropriationTheory of Liability for Insider Trading
In Yun the SEC brought charges against "tipper" Donna Yun and
fellow real estate agent and "tippee" Jerry Burch for violations of Section
10(b) of the Exchange Act,' ° which governs the disclosure of material,
nonpublic or "insider" information, and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange
Act," promulgated under the SEC's Section 10(b) rulemaking authority.1" Allegations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violations are
typically categorized by the SEC under one of two complementary
theories of liability, "each addressing efforts to capitalize on nonpublic
information through the purchase or sale of securities," but distinguishable by the degrees of separation between the source of confidential
information and the ultimate tipper and tippee. 13 Insider trading
A.

8. Yun, 327 F.3d at 1273.
9. Id. at 1274-80.
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2004).
11. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2004).
12. Yun, 327 F.3d at 1268-69 n.9. In pertinent part, Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange ... (b) To use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or
any security not so registered, . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may
prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection
of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
Rule 10b-5 provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud, . . . (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1996).
13. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997). In O'Hagan the United States
Supreme Court, for the first time, explicitly adopted the misappropriation theory of insider
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liability arises under the "traditional" or "classical theory" when a
corporate insider trades in his company's securities on the basis of
material, nonpublic (or, as used interchangeably herein, "confidential")
information. 14 This action violates the relationship of trust and
confidence and breaches the attendant duties that exist between the
corporation's shareholders and the corporation's insiders, who have
obtained confidential information by reason of their corporate position.'"
The misappropriation theory of liability, on the other hand, is designed
to address "outsider" situations where the relationship between (1) the
corporate shareholders injured by insider trading, (2) the corporate
insider and source of confidential information, and (3) the tipper and the
tippee is more attenuated. 6 Under the misappropriation theory, a
person commits fraud "in connection with" a securities transaction when
she misappropriates confidential information for securities trading
purposes in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information."7
As explained by the United States Supreme Court in United States v.
O'Hagan,'s the rationale behind the misappropriation theory is as
follows:
[A] fiduciary's undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal's information
to purchase or sell securities, in breach of a duty of loyalty and
confidentiality, defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that
information. In lieu of premising liability on a fiduciary relationship
between company insider and purchaser or seller of the company's
stock, the misappropriation theory premises liability on a fiduciary-

trading, overruling the decision in the Eighth Circuit and resolving disparate treatment
of the theory by the circuit courts. Id. at 644 ("[The Eighth Circuit misread this Court's
precedents when it ruled that . . . only a breach of a duty to parties to a securities
transaction, or, at the most, to other market participants such as investors, is sufficient to
give rise to § 10(b) liability."). To ensure that the misappropriation theory of liability was
not too indefinite in scope, as alleged by defendant O'Hagan, the Supreme Court further
emphasized that the government must prove a willful violation of Rule 10b-5 or "culpable
intent" to establish criminal liability. Id.
14. Id. at 652.
15. Id. at 651-52 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980)). The
Supreme Court further clarified that "[tihe classical theory applies not only to officers,
directors, and other permanent insiders of a corporation, but also to attorneys, accountants,
consultants, and others who temporarily become fiduciaries of a corporation." Id. at 652
(citing Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 655 n.14 (1983)).
16. Id. at 652-53.
17. Id. at 652.
18. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
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turned-trader's deception of those who entrusted him with access to
confidential information.'

9

Accordingly, the elements of a misappropriation claim include at a
minimum: (1) the misappropriation of material, nonpublic information;
(2) a breach of a duty arising out of a relationship of trust and confidence, regardless of whether such duty was owed to the shareholders of
the traded stock; and (3) the use of the material, nonpublic information
in a securities transaction.2" Moreover, as more fully discussed below,
the Eleventh Circuit (among other federal courts) requires proof of a
fourth element: that the tipper derived a personal benefit, directly or
the material, nonpublic information in
indirectly, by communicating
21
breach of his or her duty.

SEC v.Yun
In February 1997, the SEC launched its investigation into certain
trades of real estate agent Jerry Burch in Scholastic Corporation stock.
Within a few hours, Burch realized a 1300 percent return on his
investment and profits of $269,000 on Scholastic put options he
purchased during the prior two days.22 The Burch investigation led the
B.

19. Id. at 642.
20. George F. Gabel, Jr., Annotation, Who may be Liable under "Misappropriation
Theory" of Imposing Duty to Disclose or Abstain from Trading under § 10(b) of Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C.A. § 78j(b)) and SEC Rule 10b-5 (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5),
114 A.L.R. FED. 323 (2005).
21. Yun, 327 F.3d at 1274-80 (discussing at length the rationale behind requiring proof
that the tipper intended to benefit from the communication of confidential information to
the tippee under the misappropriation theory). Federal courts, however, are inconsistent
in their treatment of the "intent to benefit" element. For example, the United States
District Court for the Central District of California required a showing of the expected
benefit to the tipper. Id. at 1274-75 n.25 (citing SEC v. Trikilis, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
97,015, 9 94,462 (C.D. Cal. July 28, 1992), vacated on other grounds, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) $ 97,375, 95,981 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 1993)). On the other hand, although the issue
was never addressed squarely, both the First and Second Circuits appear to concur that
no benefit is required under the misappropriation theory. Id. at 1274-75 n.26 (citing SEC
v. Willis, 777 F. Supp. 1165, 1172 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); SEC v. Sargent, 229 F.3d 68, 75 (1st
Cir. 2000); United States v. Libera, 989 F.2d 596, 600 (2d Cir. 1993)).
22. Id. at 1268. Burch thereby proved the SEC's oft-repeated maxim that, with respect
to investments, if it sounds too good to be true, it probably is. See, e.g., United States
Securities and Exchange Commission, "WrongNumbers"and Stock Tips on YourAnswering
Machine, at http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/wrongnumberscam.htm (last modified Jan.
11, 2005) (warning that investment opportunities that promise huge guaranteed rewards
sound too good to be true because they are). Burch also neglected to realize that the SEC's
Office of Market Surveillance in the Division of Enforcement monitors market activity by
obtaining information through referrals from Self-Regulatory Organizations and through
its own surveillance, including reviews of filings and trading data. "When the Office
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SEC to fellow real estate agent Donna Yun, who shared an eleven-bythirteen-foot real estate sales trailer with Burch. Donna, in turn, was
(or is) married to David Yun, president of Scholastic Book Fairs, Inc.,
which is 23a subsidiary of Scholastic Corporation, a publicly-traded
company.
It appears undisputed that Donna learned material, nonpublic
information regarding Scholastic's stock from her husband, David, in
January 1997, following David's attendance at a management retreat.
David learned that his company would post a loss for the current
quarter and, as a result, would make a public announcement revising its
earnings forecast downward. During this same period, Donna and David
were in the process of negotiating "a post-nuptial division of assets."2 4
David, therefore, explained to Donna that he had assigned a lower value
to his Scholastic stock options in his list of assets than the current
trading price because he believed that Scholastic's share price would
decrease folowing the pending earnings announcement scheduled for
February 20, 1997. David asked Donna not to disclose the news and
Donna agreed to keep the nonpublic information confidential, with the
exception of the necessary disclosure
of David's explanation of his asset
25
valuation to Donna's attorney.
Two days before the announcement of Scholastic's earnings forecast,
Donna shared David's confidential information with her attorney during
a telephone call, which took place in the small sales trailer she shared
with Burch and others. Burch entered the office during her call and

receives or identifies information on suspicious trading patterns (insider trading or market
manipulation), it conducts additional analysis. If warranted, based on materiality and
other considerations, the Office refers the matter internally within the Division of
Enforcement or to the appropriate region." United States Securities and Exchange
Commission, Enforcement Surveillance of Markets, at http://www.sec.gov/about/oig/audit/246fin.htm (last modified Aug. 18, 2004).
23. Yun, 327 F.3d at 1267. The Yuns were still married as of June 2002, when the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida found Donna in contempt

for her failure to post a full security supersedeas bond pending the result of her appeal to
the Eleventh Circuit. SEC v. Yun, 208 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1282 (2002). In that decision, the
district court sanctioned Donna and threatened her with incarceration, at one point noting:
Although Yun has emptied her accounts several times, David Yun, Yun's husband,
has made periodic deposits into her checking account each time she has run out
of money ....
In examining the ups and downs of Yun's checking account, the
Court finds the series of Mr. Yun's deposits and Mrs. Yun's withdrawals to be
nothing more than a thinly veiled attempt to allow Yun to insist that she has no
money to pay this Court's judgment while continuing to live a life of leisure and
overindulgence.
Id. at 1286 n.17.
24. Id. at 1267.
25. Id.
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heard Donna tell her attorney about the impending earnings announcement and related price drop. 26 That evening, Donna, Burch, and
another real estate agent attended a reception together, carpooled to the
27
banquet, and stayed at the reception for three hours before departing.
Although Burch apparently had no experience dealing in put options,
the next morning he phoned his broker requesting authority to purchase
put options in Scholastic based upon information he had received at the
cocktail party the night before.2" Despite his broker's warnings about
the risks involved with trading in options and about insider trading
prohibitions, Burch nonetheless proceeded in spending the equivalent of
two-thirds of his total income for the previous year, or nearly half the
value of his entire investment portfolio, on the purchase of almost
$20,000 in Scholastic put options, some of which were scheduled to
expire within forty-eight hours. 29 On February 20, 1997, after Scholastic made its planned earnings forecast announcement, the stock price
dropped by approximately forty percent, allowing for Burch's unprecedented success with trading in put options.3"
The SEC's complaint alleged that Donna violated Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act under the misappropriation theory of
liability because Donna, an outsider, had breached her fiduciary duties
to her husband David by divulging confidential information to fellow
outsider Burch for her direct or indirect benefit. Burch, in turn, knew
or should have known of Donna's breach of her duty to David, but
nonetheless traded on the material, nonpublic information provided by
Donna for his own benefit, thereby violating Section 10(b) and Rule 10b5. The remedy sought was disgorgement of profits from the put options
trades and civil fines. In their reply, defendants Donna and Burch
admitted that Burch traded in the Scholastic put options, but averred
that neither defendant violated Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 because (1)
no fiduciary duty existed between Donna and David, and (2) in the
alternative, even if Donna owed David a fiduciary duty not to disclose

26. Id. at 1268. Burch testified at trial that he "did not learn enough from what he
overheard to feel 'comfortable' trading in Scholastic's stock." Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
A put option is an option contract that gives the holder of the option the right to
sell a certain quantity of an underlying security to the writer of the option, at a
specified price up to a specified date. The value of a put increases as the price of
the stock decreases.
Id. at 1268 n.6.
29. Id. at 1268 n.8.
30. Id. at 1268.
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the confidential information, she did not breach such duty because she
did not expect to benefit from the disclosure to Burch. 3'
C. Did a FiduciaryDuty Exist Between Donna and David?
In its discussion in Yun regarding the elements required to establish
a duty of loyalty and confidentiality owed to the source of material,
nonpublic information, the Eleventh Circuit addressed and rejected the
line of argument adopted by the majority opinion in United States v.
Chestman,32 the leading case on the topic."3 In Chestman the Second
Circuit rejected the presumption that "marriage alone creates a
relationship of loyalty and confidentiality."34 Instead, the majority in
Chestman concluded the elements of reliance and de facto control and
dominance, which are "[a]t the heart of the fiduciary relationship," must
be present to establish the functional equivalent of a fiduciary relationship.35 The dissent in Chestman took issue with the narrowness of the
majority's opinion and instead concluded that "a confidential relationship
existed between the husband and wife which gave rise to a duty of
on his part not to disclose the sensitive
loyalty and confidentiality
36
information."

The SEC understandably opted to adopt the simple, clear-cut
presumption set forth in the dissenting opinion in Chestman, which
eases its burden of proof in causes of action involving family members

brought under the misappropriation theory of liability.3 7

Effective

October 23, 2000, the SEC adopted Rule 10b5-2, which "provides a nonexclusive definition of circumstances in which a person has a duty of
trust or confidence for purposes of the 'misappropriation' theory of
insider trading under Section 10(b) of the [Exchange] Act and Rule 10b5."30 Although Rule 10b5-2 has all of the benefits of clarity usually

31. Id. at 1270.
32. 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991) (en banc).
33. Yun, 327 F.3d at 1271-72.
34. Id. at 1271 (citing Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568). This was a divided en banc
decision.
35. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568.
36. Id. at 579 (Winter, J., dissenting).
37. See Yun, 327 F.3d at 1270, 1274.
38. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2005) (Preliminary Note). Specifically, Rule 10b5-2 states:
(a) This section shall apply to any violation of Section 10(b) of the Act (15 U.S.C.
78j(b)) and § 240.10b-5 thereunder that is based on the purchase or sale of
securities on the basis of, or the communication of, material nonpublic information
misappropriated in breach of a duty of trust or confidence.
(b) Enumerated "dutiesoftrust or confidence." For purposes of this section, a "duty
of trust or confidence" exists in the following circumstances, among others:
(1) Whenever a person agrees to maintain information in confidence;
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found in bright-line rules, in Yun, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the
presumption of a relationship of trust and confidence amongst close
family members, electing instead to better define the circumstances
under which a spouse has a reasonable expectation of confidentiality
and, in the process, effectively adopted the first two prongs of Rule 10b52, but rejected the third.39 As a result, with respect to the determination of a fiduciary relationship between spouses, the Eleventh Circuit
stated,
[i]f the SEC can prove that the husband and wife had a history or
practice of sharing business confidences, and those confidences
generally were maintained by the spouse receiving the information,
then in most instances the conveying spouse would have a reasonable
expectation of confidentiality such that the breach of the expectation
would suffice to yield insider trading liability. Of course, a breach of
an agreement to maintain business confidences would also suffice.4"
With respect to the facts set forth in Yun, the court concluded that the
SEC had presented sufficient evidence that (1) Donna agreed to
safeguard the confidential information provided to her by her husband
David and (2) Donna and David had a "history or pattern of sharing and
keeping of business confidences ... such that David could have
reasonably expected Donna to keep confidential what he told her about
Scholastic's pending announcement."4 1 Having determined that the
SEC satisfied the breach of duty element under the misappropriation
theory of liability, the court then turned its attention to "an issue we
have not been called upon to decide," whether the SEC must prove that

(2) Whenever the person communicating the material nonpublic information and
the person to whom it is communicated have a history, pattern, or practice of
sharing confidences, such that the recipient of the information knows or
reasonably should know that the person communicating the material nonpublic
information expects that the recipient will maintain its confidentiality; or
(3) Whenever a person receives or obtains material nonpublic information from his
or her spouse, parent, child, or sibling; provided, however, that the person
receiving or obtaining the information may demonstrate that no duty of trust or
confidence existed with respect to the information, by establishing that he or she
neither knew nor reasonably should have known that the person who was the
source of the information expected that the person would keep the information
confidential, because of the parties' history, pattern, or practice of sharing and
maintaining confidences, and because there was no agreement or understanding
to maintain the confidentiality of the information.
Id.
39. Yun, 327 F.3d at 1272-73 n.23.
40. Id. at 1273.
41. Id. at 1273-74.
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Donna expected to benefit from the disclosure of the confidential
information to Burch. 4
D. Is the "Intent To Benefit" Element Applicable in Cases Brought
Under the MisappropriationTheory of Liability?
The "benefit to the tipper" requirement originated in the United States
Supreme Court landmark decision of Dirks v. SEC.4 The court in Yun
held that the tipper must intend to benefit personally, either via
pecuniary gains or reputational benefits, from the disclosure of
confidential information to the tippee in order to make the requisite
showing of breach of duty to the corporation's shareholders." In its
creative response to Dirks, the SEC argued that, while applicable under
the classical theory of insider trading, the intent to benefit element has
no application in misappropriation cases because no showing of a breach
of fiduciary duty to the shareholdersis required; outsiders, by definition,
owe no duty to corporate shareholders.45 The Eleventh Circuit,
however, rejected the SEC's attempt to "construct an arbitrary fence
between insider trading liability based upon classical and misappropriation theories" and to "unduly dichotomiz[e] the two theories of insider
trading liability."46 The court instead opted to require an intent to
benefit regardless of the theory of insider trading to equalize the position
of tippers and tippees. 47
The Eleventh Circuit ultimately summarized its view of insider
trading liability succinctly as follows: "(1) an insider who trades is
liable; (2) an insider who tips (rather than trades) is liable if he intends
to benefit from the disclosure; (3) an outsider who trades is liable; (4)
an outsider who tips (rather than trades) is liable if he intends to benefit
from the disclosure." 4 This approach carries the touted benefits of
simplicity without creating formulaic boundaries between the two
theories of liability that were developed, after all, with the same purpose
in mind: to address efforts to capitalize on nonpublic information
through the purchase or sale of securities.4 9 In the instant case,
because the SEC had presented evidence that Donna and Burch were
42. Id. at 1274.
43. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
44. Yun, 327 F.3d at 1275 (citing Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1276.
48. Id. at 1280.
49. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 642. In O'Hagan the Supreme Court, for the first time,
explicitly adopted the misappropriation theory of insider trading, resolving disparate
treatment of the theory by the circuit courts. See discussion supra note 13.
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friendly, worked together for several years, and split commissions on
real estate transactions, the court determined that a jury could
reasonably conclude that Donna at least expected reputational benefits
from Burch for her tip about Scholastic's pending earnings release.50
Therefore, the SEC had discharged its duty with respect to proving a
breach of Donna's duty of loyalty and confidentiality to her husband by
disclosing confidential information with the intent to benefit from such
disclosure. 5
E.

Conclusion

The Eleventh Circuit's refusal to adopt a rebuttable presumption of a
duty of trust or confidence when a person receives or obtains material,
nonpublic information from spouses, parents, children, and siblings, or
to eliminate the element of intent to benefit in misappropriation cases
honors the foundational premise that insider trading prohibitions are
premised on fraud. 52 A necessary element in virtually any action for
fraud, whether under the securities laws or under state tort laws, is
scienter-the intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.5" Accordingly,
in harmony with the express goals of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act,
to combat manipulation and deception in the securities markets the
Eleventh Circuit has rightfully placed the burden on the SEC to show
both the existence of a fiduciary duty in close family relationships and
the intent to benefit on the part of the misappropriating outsider. Any
other conclusion would run the risk of prosecuting individuals who,
perhaps foolishly or recklessly, disclosed information received from
family members without the requisite state of mind demanded by
Section 10(b).54

50. Yun, 327 F.3d at 1280.
51. Id. at 1280-81.
52. Id. at 1277-78 n.31.
53. Black's Law Dictionary defines "scienter" as:
1. A degree of knowledge that makes a person legally responsible for the
consequences of his or her act or omission; the fact of an act's having been done
2. A
knowingly, esp. as a ground for civil damages or criminal punishment ....
mental state consisting in an intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. e In this
sense, the term is used most often in the context of securities fraud. The Supreme
Court has held that to establish a claim for damages under Rule l0b-5, a plaintiff
must prove that the defendant acted with scienter.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1373 (8th ed. 2004).
54. Yun, 327 F.3d at 1278 n.34. The court in Yun provided the following helpful
example of just such a scenario:
Suppose the CEO of a public company decides, after conferring with select
members of the company's management, to confide in his wife that he is an
alcoholic and is entering a rehabilitation center. Suppose he has continually
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II. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN WHAT CONSTITUTES A "SECURITY"
At the dawn of the twentieth century, numerous states began to see
the need for legislation aimed at regulating securities issuances, due in
large measure to the proliferation of passive investing and the rapid
growth in the United States' economy. The laws enacted by these states,
collectively referred to as "blue sky" laws, are the foundation of the
securities laws as they exist today.55 In the wake of the stock market
crash of 1929, Congress developed the two major sources of federal
securities laws, the Securities Act of 1933 (the "Act")5" and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934." ' Congress built upon the existing blue sky
laws in drafting these two acts, not with the intent to predict and
address all possible situations that could arise in the capital markets,
but instead to build a flexible body of law that would protect the public
from unscrupulous promoters of stock and other fraudulent securities
schemes. The evolving definition of a security evidences this concept of
flexibility.
The Act defines a security as:

confided with her over the years and she has never broken his trust. Also suppose
that the day after he enters rehab, his wife discovers that he was having a love
affair with another woman. Angry, the wife decides to humiliate her husband by
disclosing his alcohol problems to the local newspaper editor. The editor is savvy,
and realizes that news of the CEO's alcoholism would likely cause the stock price
to fall. Accordingly, the editor buys put options in the husband's company before
printing the story. When the story hits the newsstand, and the stock price falls,
the editor makes lots of money. The question is whether the wife and the editor
are liable. The information regarding her husband's alcoholism is material and
nonpublic, the wife breached a duty of loyalty and confidentiality with her
husband, the editor was aware of the wife's breach, and the husband is harmed
(emotionally, financially, and in terms of his reputation). But, the wife did not
disclose the information with the intent that anyone would trade or benefit; she
merely wanted to harm her husband emotionally.
Under the SEC's approach the wife would be liable for the disgorgement of all
of the editor's profits. The securities laws, however, are not designed to impose
liability on a person who had no intent to trade or manipulate the market.
Section 10(b) requires fraud "in connection with" the purchase or sale of securities.
Id.
55. There are numerous theories on the origin of the term "blue sky." Most notable are
that the term refers to shady schemes that "had no more basis than so many feet of blue
sky," and that the term refers to unscrupulous promoters who "would sell building lots in
the blue sky in fee simple." SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1340 n.6
(S.D. Fla. 2000); SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 394 (2004).
56. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2004).
57. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78nn (2004).
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any note, stock, treasury stock, security future bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any
profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization
certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call,
straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or
group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on
the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege
entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign
currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known
as a "security," or any certificate of interest or participation in,
temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.58
Congress adopted broad terms in this definition in an attempt to prevent
circumvention of the Act's regulations through use of form over
substance.
Within this definition, the term "investment contract" has been the
subject of numerous legal actions.59 Some view this term as a catch-all,
allowing courts and regulators to apply their discretion when faced with
whether the investment before them constitutes a security. Investment
contract is not defined in the Act; however, the United States Supreme
Court has established the test to determine if an investment constitutes
an investment contract.6 ° In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,61 the Court held
that an investment contract involves an investment of money in a
common enterprise with profits coming solely from others' efforts.6 2
During 2004 there were two cases originating in the Eleventh Circuit
that were called upon to interpret and apply the Howey test: SEC v.
Edwards63 and SEC v. Mutual Benefits Corp.' As discussed below in
greater detail, each of these cases addresses a new issue within the
interpretation of the Howey test, and both cases preserve the breadth
and flexibility of the security definition originally intended by Congress.

58. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2004) (emphasis added).
59. See, e.g., SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
60. See id.
61. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
62. Id. at 301.
63. 540 U.S. 389 (2004).
64. 323 F. Supp. 2d 1337 (S.D. Fla. 2004).
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A. Fixed versus Variable Rates of Return-No Affect on Security
Analysis
In Edwards the investment scheme at issue was the sale and
leaseback of payphones. Defendant's wholly-owned company, ETS
Payphones, Inc. ("ETS"), sold and leased payphones to the public
through independent distributors.6 5 Although ETS offered payphones
under multiple sales and lease terms, the vast majority of ETS payphone
purchasers opted for a package involving a site lease and leaseback to
ETS. This package included a management agreement under which ETS
would install the payphones, perform day-to-day payphone operations,
and if necessary, repair the payphones. The purchasers would not be
involved in any aspect of the management and operations of the
payphones. Pursuant to this sale and leaseback arrangement, the
payphone purchasers would pay ETS $7000 per phone and receive $82
per month per phone as lease payments, representing a fixed fourteen
percent annual return based upon a five year lease term. 66
ETS became unable to make the payments under the leaseback
agreements and resorted to using new investment funds to cover such
payments.67 After some time operating under this system, ETS filed
for bankruptcy protection. Shortly thereafter, the SEC brought an
enforcement action alleging, among other matters, that defendant
violated the registration requirements of Sections 5(a)6 s and 5(c)6 9 of

the Act because the sale and leaseback arrangements constituted an
investment contract under the Act's definition of a security.7° Defendant argued that the Howey precedent required an investment contract
to involve variable profits, and because the payphone arrangement
involved fixed profits, such an arrangement was not an investment
contract as contemplated by the Act. The district court disagreed and
held that the sale and leaseback arrangement was an investment
contract under the Act's definition of a security; therefore, the Act was

65. Edwards,540 U.S. at 391. It is reported that ETS sold payphones to approximately
10,000 investors and collected approximately $300 million in proceeds therefrom. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 392. Although not addressed directly in the Court's opinion, ETS's actions
of taking investment proceeds to cover the lease payments looked very similar to the
traditional Ponzi scheme.
68. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa.
69. Id.
70. Edwards, 540 U.S. at 391. In addition to the registration requirement violations,
the SEC alleged that ETS violated the antifraud provisions of Section 17(a) of the Act and
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. Id.
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applicable. 7 The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that the sale and
leaseback arrangement was not an investment contract for the following
reasons. First, an investment contract must "offer either capital
appreciation or a participation in the earnings of the enterprise," thus
excluding the payphone sale and leaseback where the purchasers
received a fixed rate of return.72 Second, a return on investment for an
investment contract must be "derived solely from the efforts of others,"
which was not satisfied in the leaseback arrangement because the
purchasers had a contractual entitlement to a return.7 3
In reviewing the Eleventh Circuit's holding, the United States
Supreme Court identified the only issue to be "whether a moneymaking
scheme is excluded from the term 'investment contract' simply because
the scheme offered a .. fixed, rather than variable, return."7 4 The

Court began by stating that the overarching intent of the securities laws
is to regulate investments "in whatever form they are made and by
whatever name they are called."75 Within this intent, the definition of
security was born, broad enough to "encompass virtually any instrument
that might be sold as an investment."7' The Court then looked to the
test established in Howey: "whether the scheme involves an investment
of money in a common enterprise with profits to come solely from the
efforts of others."77
Defendant argued the definition of an investment contract cannot
include an investment providing a fixed rate of return due to the Howey
test's requirement that "profits to come solely from the efforts of others"
referred to the variable profits of the scheme and not fixed payments to
the investor.7 s Thus, defendant asserted the sale and leaseback
arrangement did not meet this requirement because the investors did
not share in the payphone operation's profits but merely a fixed payment
therefrom.7 9
In considering the Howey test, the Court looked to the original "blue
sky" laws, which interpreted investment contracts to be present in "a
variety of situations where individuals were led to invest money in a
common enterprise with the expectation that they would earn a profit

71. Id. at 392, 394-95.
72. Id. at 392-93 (citing SEC v. ETS Payphones, Inc., 300 F.3d 1281, 1284-85 (11th Cir.
2002) (per curiam)).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 391.
75. Id. at 393 (citing Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990)).
76. Id. (quoting Reves, 494 U.S. at 61).
77. Id. (quoting SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946)).
78. Id. at 395.
79. Id. at 397.
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solely through the efforts of a promoter."0 In light of this state law
interpretation, the Court determined that "profits [to] come solely from
the efforts of others" spoke to the "profits that investors seek on their
investment, not the profits of the scheme in which they invest," and that
"profits" referred to income or return to the purchaser in the form of
"dividends, other periodic payments, or the increased value of the
investment" among others.8 ' The Court concluded that "[tlhe fact that
investors have bargained for a return on their investment does not mean
that the return is not also expected to come solely from the efforts of
others."82 Therefore, the Court held there is no differentiation between
fixed returns and variable returns for purposes of defining an investment contract; thus, "an investment scheme promising a fixed rate of
return can be an 'investment contract' ...
subject to the federal
securities laws."" The Court stated that reading, as suggested by
defendant,
such a differentiation into the Act would in itself undermine
84
the Act.
B.

Vertical Commonality and Post-Investment Efforts of Others

The district court was faced with a more morbid issue in Mutual
Benefits Corp. than the one addressed by the Court in Edwards:viatical
settlements.8 5 A viatical settlement is a transaction where a terminally
or chronically ill holder of a life insurance policy sells the rights to the
future payout of such policy in consideration for an immediate lump-sum
payment equaling a percentage of the policy's face value. 6 Thereafter,
fractional interests in these policy benefits are sold to investors.8 7
Defendant, Mutual Benefits Corp. ("MBC"), was a viatical settlement
provider who both procured life insurance policies and sold fractional
interests therein to investors. Specifically, MBC located life insurance
policies, negotiated purchase prices, prepared the legal documents
necessary to effectuate the transactions, solicited funds from investors,
paid the policy premiums, monitored the insured's health, collected the
policy benefits upon death, and distributed the policy proceeds to the

80. Id. (quoting Howey, 328 U.S. at 298 (emphasis added)).
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. In so holding, the Court reasoned that investments with fixed returns are
"particularly attractive to individuals more vulnerable to investment fraud" and
"unscrupulous marketers of investments could evade the securities laws by picking a rate
of return to promise." Id. at 394-95.
85. Mut. Benefits Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1337.
86. Id. at 1338.
87.

Id. (citing BLACK's LAw DIcTIONARY 1377 (7th ed. 1999)).
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investors. MBC promised investors in viatical settlements rates of
return ranging from twelve percent to seventy-two percent, depending
on the term of the investment, which was determined by a life expectancy evaluation performed by MBC. MBC attempted to match investors'
preferred terms with the life expectancies of policy holders. In the event
the insured lives beyond MBC's estimated life expectancy, the investment term is extended and premiums are paid either from new investor
funds or additional funds from existing investors."8
The SEC brought an action against MBC to stop its sale of viatical
settlements, alleging such sales violated the registration requirements
of the federal securities laws. 9 MBC argued that investments in
viatical settlements are not covered by the federal securities laws
because such investments failed to meet the second and third elements
of the Howey test (commonality and profits derived from others' efforts);
therefore, the action must be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction 0
In hearing the case, the court defined "the narrow issue" as "whether
investments in viatical settlements constitute securities."9 1 The court
identified two principles upon which the federal securities laws are
based: (1) flexibility in the law's application and (2) promotion of full
disclosure.9 2 With regard to these principles, the court concluded that
"courts should determine the contours of the term security from the
posture that substance should be elevated over form, with a special
sensitivity to the economic reality of the transaction, not its formal
characteristics," and that courts should apply such flexibility to provide
the investor with full disclosure.9 3
The court noted the use of the Howey test to determine what type of
investments constitute an investment contract serves to temper such
principles. 94 As applied by the Eleventh Circuit, three elements are
required: "(1) an investment of money; (2) a common enterprise; and (3)

88. Id. During approximately ten years of operations, MBC sold viatical settlements
to over 29,000 investors nationwide and collected over $1 billion in proceeds therefrom. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1339, 1341.
91. Id. at 1339. The court pointed out that MBC was transacting in life settlements
in addition to viatical settlements. Id. at 1338. Life settlements are identical to viatical
settlements in every way except that in life settlements, the insured is not terminally or
chronically ill. Id. The Court stated that it made no differentiation between life and
viatical settlements for purposes of the "investment contract" analysis and holding. Id. at
1344.
92. Id. at 1339-40.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1341.
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the expectation of profits derived solely from the efforts of others."95
With regard to the second element, MBC argued that the appropriate
standard for determining a common enterprise is that of horizontal
commonality, where there exists a commonality among investors. 96
MBC asserted that in the case of viatical settlements, vertical commonality is not present because there is no pooling of investor funds.97 The
court determined, however, that the Eleventh Circuit recognizes vertical
commonality in determining whether a common enterprise is present. 98
Under such a standard, the investors' success only needs to be dependent
on the promoter's success with the underlying investment. 99 The court
held that because the "investors' return is highly dependent on MBC's
... skill in locating, negotiating, bidding, and evaluating [insurance]
policies," the investors' success is tied to MBC's success, and thus,
viatical settlements satisfy the vertical commonality test.10
With regard to the third element, which is the expectation of profits
derived solely from others' efforts, the court stated the appropriate test
is whether the investments are substantially passive and dependent
The
upon the "entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others."'
court noted that "solely from the efforts of others" has been relaxed to
capture situations where others' efforts are "undeniably significant ones
...
which affect the failure or success of the enterprise. " °2 The court
stated this test requires a determination on whether the profits from
viatical settlements are derived from MBC or from external market
forces beyond MBC's control.0" MBC argued that the insureds' times
of death constitute external market forces, which dictate the profits
investors receive and any variations thereof, and therefore, this external
market force caused MBC's efforts not to be a significant part in

95. Id.
96. Id. Horizontal commonality, recognized as a more stringent test, requires
interdependency among investors, typically through pooling of investor funds or pro rata
distribution of profits. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. MBC pointed to the Seventh Circuit precedent in support of MBC's assertion
that horizontal commonality should be applied. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1342 (quoting United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852
(1975)).
102. Id. (citing SEC v. Unique Fin. Concepts, Inc., 196 F.3d 1195, 1201 (11th Cir.
1999)).
103. Id. The court stated that the purpose for such distinction is that securities laws
disclosure requirements "will only protect investments that depend on the efforts of
promoters, not those that depend on the operation of external market forces." Id. (citing
SEC v. G. Weeks Sec., Inc., 678 F.2d 649 (6th Cir. 1982)).
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providing profits to the investors. 0 4 The court did not adopt MBC's
position, and instead, held that the level of profits provided to investors
is due in significant part to: (1) MBC's life expectancy evaluation and
(2) MBC's success in negotiating a desirable price for the policy
benefits-well within MBC's efforts.0 5
Lastly, the court turned to MBC's argument that the efforts of others
required in the third element of the Howey test must occur after the
investment. 10 6 To support this argument, MBC cited SEC v. Life
Partners,Inc.,"' the only federal appellate court case to address the
1
The
issue of whether a viatical settlement constitutes a security.'
court declined to adopt the Life Partnersbright-line rule that promoters'
efforts must occur post-purchase to satisfy the third element of the
Howey test.'0 9 In so doing, the court stated that bright-line tests are
not appropriate in the context of federal securities laws because such
tests create unintended loopholes." 0 The court also determined that
the Life Partners rule is "inconsistent with the policies underlying the
federal securities laws and misconceives the nature of investments in
Therefore, the court held that viatical settleviatical settlements."'
under the Howey test, and thus, fall
ments are investment contracts
112
within the coverage of the Act.
C.

Conclusion

As demonstrated by the courts in Edwards and Mutual Benefits, it
appears that courts are continuing to interpret the definition of security
broadly to capture as many investment schemes as possible. As reflected
in Edwards, the Supreme Court overturned the Eleventh Circuit by
refusing to distinguish between fixed and variable rates of return in
determining whether an investment constitutes an investment contract
pursuant to the Act." 3 Further, the Eleventh Circuit, in Mutual
Benefits, declined to adopt an appeals court precedent holding that

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 1343.
107. 87 F.3d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
108. Mut. Benefits Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1343 (referencing to Life Partners,Inc., 87
F.3d 536).
109. Id. The court did note, however, that the SEC alleged MBC performed significant
activities post-investment to satisfy the Life Partnerstest. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. The court noted that MBC had used Life Partners as a guide in structuring
MBC's business operations, creating what the court saw as a loophole precedent. Id.
112. Id. at 1344.
113. Edwards, 540 U.S. at 397.
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viatical settlements are not investment contracts."' Both of these
courts were unwilling to apply a bright-line test to the definition of
security, thus preserving a broad nature of such definition.
Additionally, both Edwards and Mutual Benefits involved an analysis
of the third element of the Howey test, which provides that the profits
of an investment are derived solely from others' efforts. Although each
addressed a different aspect of this element, both cases provided the
definition with the greatest amount of flexibility. Specifically, the
Supreme Court in Edwards determined that the Howey test's use of the
term "profits" referred to the flow of funds from the enterprise to the
investor, not the profits generated within the enterprise."' The court
in Mutual Benefits underscored that the "solely" requirement should be
lessened to "significant" efforts, declined to interpret the timing of an
insured's death as a market force outside the promoter's efforts, and
refused to require the promoter's efforts occur post-investment." 6 In
so holding, these two courts have demonstrated the bench's unwillingness, with few exceptions, to limit the scope of what constitutes a
security, and the bench's steadfast determination to preserve the breadth
and flexibility of such definition.

114.
115.
116.

Mut. Benefits Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1344.
Edwards, 540 U.S. at 395.
Mut. Benefits Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d at 1344.

